THE ARAB CONGREGATION AND THE IDEOLOGY OF GENOCIDE IN DARFUR, SUDAN
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This article presents a number of documents bearing the name of the Arab Congregation of Western Sudan (Darfur and Kordofan). It argues that attempts to annihilate indigenous Darfurians and appropriate their land are backed by Arab supremacist ideology that has been nursed over several decades. The article further argues that the Arab Congregation operates in close alliance with both national and regional circles that seek to expand what is defined as the Arab belt deeper into Sub-Saharan Africa. This article presents six documents related to Al Tajamu Al Arabi, loosely translated here as the Arab Congregation. Other translations are the Arab Coalition, Arab Gathering, Arab Alliance and Arab Congress.

The Arab Congregation was probably formed in the early 1980s but gained momentum in the latter years of that decade. Darfur has been a major site of operation of the Arab Congregation. This basic fact disguises the broader aim and geographic spread of the organization. Within Sudan, the Arab Congregation aims at displacing/controlling indigenous populations of the entire region, though modestly starting with the six States of the western regions/provinces of Kordofan and Darfur.

At the broader regional level of Sub-Saharan Africa, tentacles of the Arab Congregation spread as far as Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger and possibly beyond. The geographical spread of the organization indicates that the Arab Congregation of Western Sudan is a mere small cog within a wider network of national and regional dimensions. At the national level, the Arab Congregation of Western Sudan is sponsored and operates as a conduit for Kayan Al Shamal and hence KASH or the Northern Entity in English (EL-Thom 2006). KASH was formed in 1976 when the government of dictator Nimeri was nearly toppled by a Kordofan army officer, who would in today’s language in Sudan be classified as ‘black’ and non-Arab. KASH was then formed to ensure that irrespective of the ideology behind the government of Khartoum, democratic, fascist, military, socialist, religious fanatic or otherwise, the leadership remains in the hands of the Northern Region. But KASH is an exclusive club, open only for three elite groups of the Northern Region. This is what various circles including the Arab Congregation refer to as Al Thalooth i.e the Tripartite Coalition. The Tripartite Coalition, which has been ruling the Sudan since independence, encompasses barely three ethnic groups; the Shaigiya (Ex-President Sir Alkhatim, current Vice-President Taha), the Jallayeen (President Al Bashir) and the Danagala (Ex-President Nimeri, Ex-Prime Minister Almahdi and Ex-Vice President Alzibair). For the past forty years or so, KASH has spearheaded the project of Arab-Islamisation of the Sudan and in their pursuit of their project, they needed foot soldiers supplied by various bodies including the Arab Congregation. The hegemony of the Northern Region over Sudan is so clear-cut and requires no rerun in this article (see JEM 2004, El-Tom 2003 and Ibrahim 2004). The might of the geopolitical dimension of the Arab Congregation was chillingly demonstrated in Darfur in the early 1980s. Following the collapse of the Nimeri regime,
Khartoum government connived with Gaddafi and his disastrous gamble in Chad to turn Darfur into one of their daring crusades to push the so-called Islamic belt into Black Africa. Having been kicked out of Chad Gaddafi proceeded to locate his Islamic Legion under the command of Acheikh Ibn Omar in the Massalitland in western Darfur. The Legion, whose recruits were sourced in Chad, Mali and Niger but equally as far away as Mauritania, devastated the area and its indigenous inhabitants. Settlers of the Islamic Legion in Darfur were later to play a prominent role as Janjaweed, effectively executing Musa Hilal’s call ‘change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes’ (Flint and De Waal 2005, see also Flint and De Waal). Attempts to change the demography of Darfur are still going on to this day. As recently as July 2007, Bloomfield accused the government of Sudan of ‘cynically trying to change the demography of the whole region’. Monitoring the Chadian-Sudanese borders, Bloomfield wrote:

An internal UN report, obtained by the Independent, shows that up to 30,000 Arabs have crossed the border in the past three months. Most arrived with all their belongings and large flocks. They were greeted by Sudanese Arabs who took them to empty villages cleared by the government and Janjaweed forces … further 45,000 Arabs from Niger have also crossed over’ (Bloomfield 2007).

At least three conclusions can be drawn so far, each of which connects with a general misconception about the current conflict in Darfur. Firstly, Darfur conflict cannot be reduced to a strife that is internal to Darfur and as an outcome of environmentally generated scarcity of resources. Rather, the conflict is part and parcel of national and regional dynamics as well as aspirations. Secondly, the Janjaweed are not a by-product of the present Darfur conflict. Their current involvement in the Darfur war is a mere culmination of decades of atrocities in the region as well as in other parts of the Sudan, such as Abeye in Southern Sudan. Thirdly, the reading that the Khartoum unleashed the Janjaweed following the rebellion in Darfur is factually incorrect. On the contrary, the Darfur rebellion took place due to several reasons including atrocities of the Janjaweed against indigenous Darfurians.

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